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PROFESSOR O'CONNELL'S METHOD FOR ENDING
INSULT TO INJURY: CAN IT SOLVE THE
AIR CRASH LITIGATION DILEMMA
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ*

INTRODUCTION

p

ROFESSOR Jeffrey O'Connell of the University of Illinois has
produced a major work of tort law reform. It is a book entitled Ending Insult to Injury-No-Fault Insurance for Products
and Services. It was published by the University of Illinois Press in
February, 1975. O'Connell obtained grants for his project from the

John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, the Foundation
for Insurance Research, Study and Training of the League Insurance Group of Detroit, and the Center for Advanced Study of the
University of Illinois.
O'Connell launches a devastating critique of the entire tortlitigation system in the book. He then supplies a cure for those difficulties. He does not specifically address himself to the problem of
personal injuries caused by commercial airline crashes. Rather, his
focus is on products liability and medical malpractice. This article will attempt to apply both O'Connell's criticisms and his solutions to the area of injuries caused by airline crashes. Finally, it
will indicate some of the problems that might arise if O'Connell's
no-fault system were substituted for the present tort litigation
approach.
I. THE PRESENT SYSTEM AND ITS DEFICIENCIES

As the reader is aware, in a suit against an airline for personal
injuries caused in an accident, liability is based on negligence. In
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order to recover from the airline carrier, the plaintiff must prove
that the airline failed to use "reasonable care" and that this failure
was the proximate cause of the accident.
To assist the plaintiff with problems of proof, some courts have
applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Assuming that the crash
occurred on a clear day and under circumstances where accidents
would not ordinarily happen in the absence of negligence, the burden of proof on the issue of reasonable care may shift to the airline. But most aircraft accidents do not happen under those circumstances-there is bad weather or other adverse conditions. Further,
even if the res ipsa doctrine is applied, the airline may be able to
show that the accident was not due to its fault, but rather was
brought about by other causes. Stuart Speiser, an authority who
has studied this field, boldly advises plaintiffs' attorneys not to rely
on res ipsa.1
Of course, the injured party may be able to avoid the burden of
proving "fault" altogether if he can show that the airplane itself
was "defective" within the meaning of Section 402(a) of the Restatement of Torts (Second) (strict products liability). He then
sues the aircraft manufacturer or possibly the manufacturer of a
component of the aircraft. If plaintiff can prove that the crash was
caused by a "defect," he may have a cause of action.
Nevertheless, as most practitioners know, strict liability under
402(a) promises more in theory than it delivers in fact. After a
crash has occurred, it is difficult to pinpoint a defect in construction. We are not dealing with a soda pop bottle that has exploded!
In sum, whether plaintiff is attempting to prove fault against the
carrier or a defect in a 402(a) case against an aircraft manufacturer, he will face many serious obstacles in developing his proof.
What was the responsibility of the aircraft traffic control system?
What effect did meteorological phenomena have on the accident?
What is the relationship between the technical variables of aerodynamics and the cause of the accident? Frankly, few lawyers (and
perhaps even fewer judges and very few jurors) have mastered
this growing body of knowledge.
While the advent of flight recorders and National Transportation Safety Board investigations has helped plaintiffs in their search
1

S. SPEISER, RES IPSA LOQUITUR § 10.11.
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for the facts, they will not-standing alone-prove his case for
him. Plaintiff's counsel will have to hire experts to assist him both
before and during trial and the cost will be substantial.
Under the present system, plaintiff usually does not expend any
out-of-pocket money. His case is handled on a contingent fee basis.
Nevertheless, that fee does reduce the amount of his recovery-as
much as 50 percent in some jurisdictions. Aside from plaintiff's
recovery being reduced, it also is often delayed. When there has
been a death of a male "breadwinner"-the unfortunate victim in
a typical air crash case-there is a vital need for immediate compensation to the widow. This may cause her to agree to a settlement that is not entirely fair.
While some plaintiffs receive less than they should under the
present system, some are not compensated at all. First, there is
the group of persons who have received relatively minor injuries
in an aircraft accident. Because their potential damage award is
low, they may not be able to obtain competent counsel to pursue
their case. Second, there are those who suffered death or serious
injury, but recover no damages. This group is much smaller than
those who are injured in other kinds of accidents-estimates indicate that it may be as low as 7 percent.! Nevertheless, those 7 percent are part of what might apepar to be a lottery. After all, a passenger has no real control over his fate once he is on board an ordinary commercial aircraft. The passenger or his representatives
ordinarily do not lose their case because decedent was contributorily negligent or because he assumed the risk; rather, the case
is lost because he cannot prove negligence against the carrier or
the government or a 402(a) claim against the aircraft manufacturer.
The present tort litigation system may not only work to the
disadvantage of plaintiff, but also may impose undue costs upon
defendants. They must pay, directly or indirectly, a substantial
amount of money for attorneys to defend them. Further, some of
the damages that they must pay may not represent the plaintiffs
actual pecuniary losses. First, the plaintiff may obtain a "double
recovery" where an item of damage has been already paid by a collateral source. Second, in cases where plaintiff may have lived for a
' See Note, Domestic Commercial Aircraft Tort Litigation: A Proposal For
Absolute Liability of the Carriers,23 STAN. L. REV. 569, 573 (1971).
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period of time after the accident, a substantial amount of money
may be awarded for "conscious pain and suffering." For those uninitiated in the law, it is a spectacle to watch a survival action with
experts on both sides swearing whether a decedent lived long enough
to experience "conscious" pain and suffering. The individual, of
course, is no longer there to collect. How does this compensate a
victim?
Throughout his book, O'Connell stresses the theme that the
amount of plaintiff's recovery in court is not based on his true
needs. He caustically observes that "a lawyer quickly learns that
padding on medical costs is really as good as coining money-no
real risk to anyone."' He quotes veteran personal injury attorney
Verne Lawyer's trial practice advice in regard to how plaintiff
should dress in court.' O'Connell observes, with total cynicism:
"What the plaintiff's appearance has to do with the amount of his
suffering is something that Verne Lawyer does not undertake to
explain."'
In sum, O'Connell would charge the present "tort" litigation
approach to commercial airline crashes with the following deficiencies:
1. Liability turns on complicated fact situations with concomitant expense and delay.
2. There is a class of defendants whose instinct is to resist settlement unreasonably.
3. The expense of litigation is such that only large claims are
brought. Persons who receive minor injuries in aircraft accidents may be unable to obtain counsel who will find it worth
their while to pursue the claim.
4. Too small a percentage of the money paid into the liability
insurance system actually goes to pay injured plaintiffs. Most
of it is used for attorney's fees and insurance company overhead."
'J.
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II. ALTERNATIVES

TO THE TORT-LITIGATION SYSTEM

Assuming these represent valid criticisms of the present system,
what are the alternatives? Some propose that the common law of
torts shift all aircraft accidents to a strict liability basis. In other
words, both the airline carrier and the manufacturer would be
strictly liable if an individual were injured in an aircraft. O'Connell
does not find this approach very appealing-he makes a rather
cogent argument that it is simply arbitrary law and imposes too
great a financial burden on defendants without a corresponding
benefit to plaintiffs. O'Connell believes that it is time to move away
from common law methods of compensating for injuries and turn
to "ambitious legislation for reform." He indicates that we should
no longer rely "so much on the tortured, torturous, even torturing
tort system with its case by case common law crawl-a system
from which law professors derive so much fascination, law practitioners so much income, and the general public so few benefits.""
In regard to legislative solutions, O'Connell rejects the New Zealand approach of putting the accident costs under social security.8
He notes that the potential cost of such a system would be astronomical. In this regard, he observes that national health insurance
proposals always cost more than their sponsors allege, and do not
cover the wage loss which is 79 percent of the cost of most injuries.!
Cost consideration aside, O'Connell believes that it would be
unwise to have all injuries paid out of an undifferentiated pool of
insurance." The activity or industry responsible, herein airline
carriers, would not in any way be made to pay for the losses it
causes.
Surprisingly, O'Connell also rejects the no-fault automobile insurance system that he and Robert Keeton proposed in the book
Basic Protection for the Auto Victim-variants of which have
been enacted in a number of states. O'Connell does note that: "No
army of trial attorneys or timid insurance executives will stop [nofault automobile insurance] now.""
There are two reasons why no-fault automobile insurance sys'O'Connell at 67.
Old. at 73-80.
9
1Id.at 75.
10

d. at 78-80.

"1Id. at 70.
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tems would be inapplicable to aircraft passenger injuries. First,
there was widespread use of liability insurance by automobile owners prior to no-fault. It was relatively easy to transfer that existing
liability insurance into no-fault loss insurance. Put more graphically, very often both actors in a particular accident (two cars)
were already covered by an insurance system. This situation is not
true with passengers and commercial airlines or aircraft manufactures. Secondly, automobile accidents involve a rather distinctive
activity wherein the statute can readily identify who is to pay for
what loss. As a number of speakers at this Symposium have stressed, this can be an extraordinarily complex problem in the context
of air crash litigation.
O'Connell also rejects massive "enterprise" liability wherein each
enterprise would have to pay for all the injuries it generates without regard to fault or defect. This, he believes, would be much too
costly and involve overwhelming problems with respect to the issue of causation.
III. THE

O'CONNELL PLAN FOR ENDING INSULT TO INJURY

O'Connell then introduces his basic proposal which he calls
"Elective No-Fault":
Any enterprise should be allowed to elect ... to pay for injuries
it causes on a no-fault basis. It would elect to make payment regardless of any fault on its part, or any fault on the part of the
victim."2
The enterprise would be allowed to select some or all of its typically created risks and agree to pay all out-of-pocket losses when an
injury results from those risks. Thus, an airline could indicate it
would pay up to a certain amount of damages on a no-fault basis
whenever death or bodily injury to a passenger resulted from a
crash that occurred during the course of transportation. To the extent that the airline made this selection, it would make no payment
for any amount covered by a collateral source and it would make
no payment for pain and suffering. Most importantly, to the extent the airline made this election, it would be shielded from a tort
suit by the victim.
O'Connell speculates that while an enterprise that made the
11Id. at

97.
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election would end up paying many more victims than it does at
present, it probably would reduce its total payment. O'Connell
would throw in a few more "sweeteners" that would be most important in the context of commercial airline accidents. Term life
insurance might be regarded as a "collateral source." Recovery for
loss of wages might be limited to $200.00 a week as long as permanent disability lasted, with correspondingly lesser amounts for
temporary or partial losses.
Finally, the enterprise would benefit because the "stigma of liability" would be substantially reduced or removed. No longer
would an airline be paying because it was negligent nor would an
aircraft manufacturer be paying because its product was "defective." Rather, compensation would be awarded on the neutral
ground that the airline or manufacturer was a partial "cause of an
accident."
O'Connell's system might make good economic sense for the
airline carrier industry or the aircraft manufacturing industry because the operations of both give rise to expectable risks that can
be readily defined.
There are a few more enticements that O'Connell has thrown in
in order to obtain industry support for his proposal. He would
allow enterprises to experiment with this system. First, they would
set the limitations on their no-fault coverage. Secondly, they could
limit the application of no-fault liability to injuries incurred in certain geographical areas in order to gain a "control group." Thirdly,
they could set limitations based on time. Thus, an aircraft manufacturer could limit his "no-fault" insurance in terms of the number
of years his product is on the market.
O'Connell believes that accident victims will readily give up payments for "pain and suffering" and the right to have double recovery in order to get prompt and certain payment for real out-ofpocket losses. He offers a survey conducted in Illinois that gives
some support to his claim.13
O'Connell and others who propose no-fault systems would probably contend that the deterrent aspect of tort law is not needed
with regard to air accidents. The no-fault proponents would concede that in the past the fault system was essential because it forced
13

1d. at 116.
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airline carriers to pinpoint the cause of the accident and take corrective action.
Tort law's deterrent function may be fulfilled by at least three
programs at present. First, the NTSB publishes an airline accident
report that is usually detailed and comprehensive. The Federal
Aviation Administration can take appropriate action on the basis
of that report. Secondly, the inspection requirements of the Federal Aviation Administration are supposed to guard against defective airframes. Thirdly, the FAA's periodic maintenance requirements are a substantial check against accidents.
Moreover, an airline that elected no fault would always be liable
for damages in case of crashes. It would be encouraged to investigate accidents freely and immediately and share with other carriers
information that it obtained. Airlines would have no-risk personal
economic incentives to find out whether the crash was "their own
fault," the fault of the manufacturer of the airframe, or of the
government.
While O'Connell's elective no-fault system would be established
by the legislature, it would give great power to airlines and aircraft
manufacturers to determine for themselves how much no-fault coverage they wish to have. An Insurance Commissioner would regulate administrative problems that might arise.
Again, the airline or manufacturer would have a number of incentives to adopt this system because:
1. It would not have to pay any amount of damage that was
covered by a "collateral source."
2. It would not have to pay for pain and suffering.
3. It would avoid the in-court cost of determining fault or the
existence of a defect in the aircraft.
4. It would avoid the stigma of liability.
In connection with the fourth element, no one could preclude
common law liability for intentionally caused injuries-however,
this would seem relatively insignificant with regard to airlines or
aircraft. If the airline or aircraft manufacturer were grossly negligent, however, it would still have the benefit of its "no-fault" shield.
O'Connell and others who have drafted "no-fault" insurance systems would define intent quite narrowly.
O'Connell finds an analogy for his system in so-called "elective"
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workmen's compensation laws. He admits that the analogy is not
entirely congruent for in most states that have elective workmen's
compensation laws the worker can decline to choose the benefits
it provides and preserve his rights under the common law (very
few workers have done this)." Nevertheless, O'Connell believes
that as a practical matter potential victims of accidents caused by
products or services are not in a position to make this election.
While one might question this observation as applied to passengers
on airlines, his system would not work as a practical matter if some
passengers could elect not to participate.
Most recently, O'Connell has suggested that his system be attempted without any legislative guidelines at all."5 In other words
an airline, through notice to its passengers, might impose no-fault
on its potential victims. The manufacturer of aircraft would give
very general notice in advertisements about its products. While
this technique might be regarded as unconscionable under the Uniform Commercial Code (prima facie under UCC 2-719(3)) or
attacked by regulatory agencies, O'Connell believes that it should
be upheld because it imposes the same "bargain" on potential
victims that has long been recognized as fair and just in workmen's
compensation and most recently acknowledged under no-fault automobile insurance.
IV. SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE O'CONNELL PLAN

Perhaps the attraction of O'Connell's plan (or its insidiousness)
lies in its surface simplicity. If one digs below the surface, however, one can find a number of rather serious problems. Let me
suggest my top "six."
First, the book does not present a statute. Many plans that
sound rather attractive in book form run into serious problems
when one has to sit down and draft how they will work in practice."
Second, many persons might question why airlines, aircraft
4

d. at 117.
" O'Connell, Elective No-Fault By Contract-With or Without An Enabling
Statute, 1975 U. ILL. L. FOR. 59.
x" Since the time this speech was delivered Professor O'Connell has produced
a statute. See O'Connell, An Elective No-Fault Liability Statute, (1975) INS. L.J.
261. The statute is very helpful in filling in some of the practical details of
O'Connell's proposal, but it also is illustrative of the observation made in my
original speech. An evaluation of the statute must await another day.
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manufacturers and other potential tortfeasors should be allowed to
benefit from the collateral sources that have been paid for by victims. In effect, tortfeasors would be allowed to externalize some
costs of accidents they cause by using the victims' money because
the victim has paid for the insurance provided by the collateral
source.
Third, O'Connell's system may place too much power in the
hands of the airlines and reduce the deterrent impact of tort law.
The assumption that tort law is superfluous in the area of airline
accidents is based on argument only. Do we want to give it a test?
The recent situation involving the DC 10 cargo door defect may
suggest that more, not fewer, incentives for safety are needed. Does
the specter of the large common law tort award serve as a true
auxiliary deterrent function?
Fourth, although O'Connell discusses problems relating to indemnity and contribution, they deserve more attention." How are
claims to be handled between those who elect and those who do not
elect to participate in the no-fault system? Between two parties who
elect no-fault? More specifically, how do we handle airline claims
against manufacturers of aircraft, manufacturers of aircraft components or the United States government? Assuming the general
approach is to put the cost of the injury on the party that caused
the accident (which O'Connell suggests), will the costs and time
involved in potential contribution and indemnity claims substantially compromise the economic efficiency of the O'Connell proposals?
Fifth, what about the grossly negligent or reckless defendantshould it be allowed to escape tort liability merely by electing "nofault"?
Sixth, will a claim that might be worth a reasonable amount
above the threshold be handled in a fair and just manner? For
example, suppose an airline "elects" to be covered by no-fault up
to $200,000. A victim has a $225,000 claim. Since the airline will
be able to "deduct" the $200,000 from any payment it makes, is
there sufficient incentive for a lawyer to go through the expensive
process of trying an aircraft litigation case when the potential
"added" recovery is only $25,000?
" O'Connell at 152-56.
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CONCLUSION

There are strengths and weaknesses in O'Connell's plan. Attorneys who earn their living on the basis of the tort-litigation system
are likely to conclude that the weaknesses outweigh the strengths.
Nevertheless, they and all persons interested in tort law will find it
worthwhile to read and understand O'Connell's proposals. They
have more substance than most ideas that flow from academia.

